Search: “guardrails”

arXiv:2606.19386v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Runtime monitors for autonomous agents commonly threshold an accumulated internal state - a behavioural baseline, a drift statistic, or, in ou

arXiv:2610.08840v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) often abandon a correct answer, or endorse a user's position, once the user pushes back. This behavior, called sycophancy,

arXiv:2610.09033v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Standard safety evaluations of large language models assess harmful requests written in canonical plain text, while models in real-world deployment rout

arXiv:2610.08413v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models routinely answer questions that cannot be answered from the information given, and in dialogue they answer before enough has bee

arXiv:2610.08082v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM tool-use agents operate in dynamic environments where many actions carry operational risk. However, most safety mechanisms react only after errors m

arXiv:2610.03153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Workspace agents combine large language models with execution harnesses to perform stateful, multi-step tasks that access or modify external resources

arXiv:2610.02293v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: HakemBench is a Turkish benchmark of typed decisions, in which the model under test reads a text, a question and a fixed set of options and returns a pr

arXiv:2610.02827v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern AI systems are designed to refuse hazardous requests. A jailbreak is a prompt crafted to bypass those safeguards and elicit outputs that the syst

arXiv:2610.00015v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large-language-model agents can propose and execute actions, but proposal, authority, dispatch, verified external effect, and serving promotion are diff

arXiv:2610.00797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Contextual security defenses prevent AI agents from taking rogue actions by synthesizing a task-specific policy and enforcing it on the agent's tool cal

arXiv:2609.38458v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Clinical large language model (LLM) agents deployed locally can consult more capable remote models, but doing so risks exposing patient information. Pri

arXiv:2609.39701v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Value steering should change an LLM's normative priorities while preserving the scenario, facts, and task constraints underlying its answer. Conventiona

arXiv:2609.31358v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) provides a common interface through which AI applications discover and use external resources and tools. It allows la

arXiv:2609.30967v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Most work on improving large language models treats accuracy as the sole objective. We argue that the harness, the Python code surrounding the model tha

arXiv:2609.30325v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agents are increasingly deployed with real autonomy in web application and network penetration testing, where a single out-of-scope action can breach a

arXiv:2609.30614v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dataspace connectors decide whether a transfer may occur, not what the transferred value contains, tolerable for contracted applications, not for LLM

arXiv:2609.28197v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents that alter real-world states, ensuring operational safety across multi-step workflows has

arXiv:2609.17686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Three recent results describe what look like unrelated LLM reliability problems. Yin et al. (2026) show reasoning RL collapses tool-reliability repres

arXiv:2609.16647v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Gender bias in large vision-language models (LVLMs) undermines their fairness and reliability, compromising output trustworthiness. Current mitigation m

arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provide

arXiv:2609.14211v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Scientific applications increasingly rely on high-performance computing (HPC), yet translating a scientist's high-level goal into a correct target-sca

arXiv:2609.15045v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt echoing is a recognized failure mode of instruct language models, in which a model instead of generating a response, mirrors the provided promp

arXiv:2609.14115v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety-critical control of autonomous systems requires formal safety certificates, such as controlled invariant sets, that must be computed online as

arXiv:2602.05354v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous web agents are increasingly deployed in moderation and policy enforcement, where correct decisions often depend on evidence that is not i

arXiv:2609.07194v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present EmoMed - a multimodal medical consultation agent that adapts its responses based on users' emotional states while maintaining clinical accura

arXiv:2609.08789v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier AI developers publish safety frameworks that commit them to evidencing whether their models are dangerous. The European Union and California

arXiv:2609.06540v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, yet jailbreak attacks can conceal harmful intent through role-

arXiv:2609.06851v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Broad misalignment has been produced by finetuning on narrow data, harmful or benign, and in context only by demonstrations of the undesirable behavio

arXiv:2508.00935v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Computer-using agents (CUAs), which can autonomously control computers to perform multi-step actions, might pose significant safety risks if m

arXiv:2609.02168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fragmented safety evaluation undermines the governance of dangerous AI capabilities. We present a modular framework that evaluates each model through th

arXiv:2609.02754v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models now answer medical questions with expert-level performance. However, the context these systems act on can be misleading, and mis

arXiv:2609.00015v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, controll

arXiv:2608.29378v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Arabic large language models must refuse harmful prompts without over-refusing benign or sensitive prompts, yet a single refusal rate hides this trade

arXiv:2608.29228v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Failures in agentic AI systems can arise from interactions among messages exchanged by multiple large language model (LLM) agents. Pointwise attribution

arXiv:2608.28593v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With the increasing development of AI regulatory frameworks, ensuring that artificial intelligence systems, particularly generative models, operate in a

arXiv:2608.27102v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) operate in hospitals, courtrooms, banks, and public service desks, where fluent, confident outputs are treated as authorita

arXiv:2608.24087v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current LLM agent systems decide delegation before reasoning begins (a router picks a model) or after a response is complete (a verifier scores it and

arXiv:2608.23941v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Pre-execution oversight is core to trusted monitoring in AI control: a fallible LLM monitor vets planned actions before irreversible execution. Over-blo

arXiv:2608.23635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) rely on tool calling as a fundamental agent capability, enabling them to invoke external systems and complete tasks beyon

arXiv:2608.20378v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) is often superficial, relying on refusal mechanisms that trigger only at the final stages of generation

arXiv:2608.19216v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI control research asks how to deploy models safely even when they may be misaligned, but many control protocols assume that the deployer can instrumen

arXiv:2608.19902v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents can execute scientific analyses, but an analytic output becomes a defensible claim only after alternatives are weighed and the claim is limite

arXiv:2512.14012v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rise of AI agents is transforming how software can be built. The promise of agents is that developers might write code quicker, delegate m

arXiv:2608.14392v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Neuron- and path-level interventions offer the finest-grained route to defending large language models (LLMs) against jailbreak attacks, yet existing me

arXiv:2608.12821v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to harmful requests and jailbreak attacks. Parameter-efficient safety alignment methods based on prompt t

arXiv:2608.10532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Static load balancers cannot mitigate a backend that is degraded rather than down: round-robin and least-connections keep routing traffic to a server