BackDFL: A Unified Benchmark For Backdoor Attacks and Defenses In Decentralized Federated Learning

arXiv:2608.21137v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) promises trust-free collaborative learning by replacing the centralized parameter server with peer-to-peer model exchange. However, this architectural shift fundamentally reshapes the threat landscape. Without globally coordinated aggregation, DFL becomes particularly susceptible to backdoor attacks, in which malicious participants implant persistent hidden behaviors while maintaining high clean-task performance. In this paper, we argue that the robustness of DFL has been significantly overestimated. Existing studies rely on simplified threat models, non-adaptive adversaries, fragmented evaluation protocols, inconsistent communication topologies, and ad hoc training configurations, leading to an incomplete understanding of DFL security. To address these limitations, we present BackDFL, a unified benchmark for systematically evaluating DFL under realistic and adaptive backdoor attacks. Through extensive experiments, BackDFL exposes critical failure modes of decentralized learning. Our results demonstrate that both state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust DFL methods and adapted FL backdoor defenses fail under modest malicious participation rates (as low as 15%), especially in heterogeneous settings, while their robustness varies substantially across communication graph topologies.

Related

• Defending Against Backdoor Attacks via Alignment Checking in Model-Contrastive Federated Learning
• Secure Decentralized Federated Learning via Gossip and Virtual Voting
• Beyond Parameter Space: NTK-Guided Personalized Aggregation for Robust Federated Learning

Source: arXiv cs.LG | 2026-08-24