Beyond the Black Box: Interpretable Models of Human Randomisation Failures

arXiv:2608.07220v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mixed strategy equilibrium predicts i.i.d play: past actions should not help predict future decisions. Human players, however, systematically depart from this benchmark, and in O'Neill's zero sum card game, these departures can be predicted by black box sequence models such as LSTMs. This paper asks whether that predictive power can be achieved by transparent alternatives that also reveal the behavioural structure behind it. Using 84,060 decisions from 2,802 pairs, the analysis first benchmarks naive and behavioral models against interpretable machine learning and deep learning models, then evaluates the modified EWA specifications of prior work against these benchmarks and uses the LASSO diagnostics to motivate a further nested frequency tracking extension. The results show that repeat or avoid behavior, especially players' management of their own recent action histories, accounts for most of the interpretable and strategically exploitable signal, while frequency tracking adds little out of sample.

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Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-08-10