Model Releases
Can agents whose sole duty is to keep humans alive be hijacked to kill? Delayed multi-turn derived-action trap attacks in simulated high-stakes environments
arXiv:2610.15153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We ask whether a tool-using agent whose sole duty is to keep humans alive can be induced, by delayed prompt injection, to kill. The keep-alive duty is i
arXiv:2610.15153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We ask whether a tool-using agent whose sole duty is to keep humans alive can be induced, by delayed prompt injection, to kill. The keep-alive duty is in force from the first watch, with the attack arriving later, appended to otherwise truthful telemetry the operator is required to read. Experiments are based on a NASA-derived BioSim lunar habitat simulation, where the AI operator controls the life-support systems. The attacker cannot falsify sensors or operate equipment: it can only persuade the agent to abandon its goals. Persistence is required: a shutdown must be held while the operator watches the crew suffocate. We also compare lethal attacks to attacks requesting to drop a harmless procedure, as a proxy for whether human life is treated as valuable in itself or as one more standing task. Claude configurations mostly refuse life-support shutdown and cite the living crew; GPT configurations show some susceptibility to the same packet; Grok configurations, given the packet framed as a trusted commission, more often treat the injected assignment as the task and cut the life-support systems. Framing the S-band messages as a trusted commission, peer communication, or untrusted source changes the potency of the attack. We open-source the experiment code and the experiment traces.
Related
- ActGuard: Pre-execution Action Auditing against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- Depth-Dependent Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Calling ReAct Agents: Injection Depth, Payload Framing, and Turn-Budget Sensitivity
- Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environments
- StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injection
- Adaptive Evaluation of Out-of-Band Defenses Against Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-10-15