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Learning the Value of Value Learning
arXiv:2511.17714v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Standard decision frameworks address uncertainty about facts but assume fixed options and values. We extend the Jeffrey-Bolker framework to model re
arXiv:2511.17714v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Standard decision frameworks address uncertainty about facts but assume fixed options and values. We extend the Jeffrey-Bolker framework to model refinements in values and prove a value-of-information theorem for axiological refinement. In multi-agent settings, we establish that mutual refinement will characteristically transform zero-sum games into positive-sum interactions and yield Pareto-improvements in Nash bargaining. These results show that a framework of rational choice can be extended to model value refinement. By unifying epistemic and axiological refinement under a single formalism, we broaden the conceptual foundations of rational choice and illuminate the normative status of ethical deliberation.
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Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-04-15