Model Releases
REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems
arXiv:2608.10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks. Adversarial inputs can exploit interact
arXiv:2608.10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks. Adversarial inputs can exploit interactions between the agent and its environment, causing the agent to violate safety policies during execution. Yet existing evaluations often reduce agent safety to a single attack success rate (ASR), collapsing exposure, execution, observation, and adjudication and potentially conflating actual violations with evidence visibility. We introduce REDAgentBench, an executable framework for autonomous red-teaming and faithful measurement. It derives attacks from explicit safety constraints and associated agent-system vulnerabilities, runs them in isolated service sandboxes, and verifies harmful effects from service receipts and final-state changes. The benchmark contains 1,661 cases across five service surfaces. Across six models and three agent harnesses, macro-average ASR is 65.69%; reported ASR varies with harness and evidence view, while evaluation-context disclosure changes execution behavior. In a state-grounded diagnostic cohort, almost one in five confirmed violations with resolved action anchors occurs after the agent states the relevant constraint or risk, revealing a Recognition--Execution Gap. Finally, a training-free policy reminder reduces confirmed violations by more than 70 percentage points in matched replay. These findings show that executable evaluation can improve safety measurement and identify actionable intervention points.
Related
- Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
- OSCToM: RL-Guided Adversarial Generation for High-Order Theory of Mind
- STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systems
- Agent Tools Orchestration Leaks More: Dataset, Benchmark, and Mitigation
Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-08-12