Safe Equilibrium Policy Optimization for Strategic Agent Policies

arXiv:2605.30854v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language models fine-tuned with reinforcement learning typically optimize for task reward, ignoring multi-agent strategic structure. Because these agents condition on natural language game-state descriptions and emit actions through free-form generation, strategic failure modes -- exploiting weaker opponents, coordinating on harmful equilibria, and externalizing costs are inseparable from the language interface itself. We propose Safe Equilibrium Policy Optimization (sepo{}), a training objective that augments expected payoff with explicit penalties for exploitability, collusion risk, and externality cost. We implement sepo{} as a reward signal for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), applied to Gemma4 E4B-it and Qwen3.5-4B after supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Evaluated across five strategic domains: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated auctions, two negotiation variants, and Kuhn Poker. sepo{} achieves zero exploit-pool advantage in Kuhn Poker for both models, outperforms the base model on safety in four domains, and corrects the over-cooperative behavior introduced by SFT. In negotiation, sepo{} achieves a positive-safety outcome and only the positive normalized relative advantage of any negotiation configuration. Ablation experiments confirm that per-rollout exploit computation is necessary: a shared constant penalty cancels in GRPO advantage normalization (constant control-variate property), producing zero gradient. To support further research in strategic safety for agents, we release our href{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/sepo-2668/README.md}{code} and SFT datasets.

Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-06-01