Unknown Unknowns: Do Hidden Intentions in LLMs Evade Detection?

arXiv:2601.18552v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLMs expand accessibility and provide wide-reaching access to information. Yet these interactions also create opportunities to embed subtle, goal-oriented behaviours that shape what users think and how they behave, a concern reflected in governance frameworks that prohibit manipulative AI. We refer to these behaviours as hidden intentions: covert agendas embedded in a model's outputs that can manipulate users' beliefs and actions. In this work, we examine whether hidden intentions can be identified and characterised, and assess whether detection can serve as a mitigation strategy. To operationalise this, we introduce a social-science-grounded set of ten hidden intention categories and show that they are trivially inducible. A case study further confirms that all ten categories manifest in deployed LLMs. We then evaluate static classifiers and LLM judges on these categories, providing the first systematic analysis of why hidden intentions are difficult to detect. Our stress tests show that, unless false-positive rates are vanishingly small, auditing is dominated by precision-prevalence trade-offs. Capability scaling and reasoning models do not close this gap, suggesting a fundamental challenge for open-world detection. These findings expose a core gap of current AI governance: without new auditing paradigms for open-world, low-prevalence risks, bans on manipulative AI remain difficult to enforce.

The Calls are Coming from Inside the Model: Investigating Probe-based Detection of Tool-Calling Errors in LLMs

Source: arXiv cs.CL | 2026-09-01

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