Knowledge catalogue
arXiv:2511.14301v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning defe
arXiv:2609.06094v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Red-teaming Text-to-Image (T2I) models is essential for safe deployment, yet it remains particularly challenging against implicit adversarial prompts. U
arXiv:2603.10807v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Existing LLM safety evaluations rely on binary attack-success rates and domain-agnostic taxonomies, leaving regulated Banking, Financial Servi
arXiv:2603.10068v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Most adversarial evaluations of large language model (LLM) safety assess single prompts and report binary pass/fail outcomes, which fails to c
arXiv:2608.04018v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are increasingly embedded in organizational workflows, where they interact with external information sources and invoke digital tools to per
arXiv:2507.22063v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation (i.e., Code LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in AI-assisted software developme
arXiv:2606.28347v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Contemporary AI safety spans pre-training interventions, post-training alignment, deployment-time controls, monitoring, and red-teaming. These methods
arXiv:2606.00801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current approaches to LLM adversarial testing suffer from coverage gaps: manual red-teaming does not scale, LLM-as-attacker methods exhibit mode colla
arXiv:2506.11083v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce RedDebate, a novel multi-agent debate framework that provides the foundation for Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify and mitigate
arXiv:2603.17305v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We propose CRAFT, a red-teaming alignment framework that leverages model reasoning capabilities and hidden representations to improve robustness aga
arXiv:2605.14868v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Generating adversarial examples at scale is a core primitive for robustness evaluation, adversarial training, and red-teaming, yet even 'fast' attacks s
A challenge with AI regulation and vetting is how bad our benchmarks of AI model performance and risks are. There is no benchmark for risks and red-teaming requires experiments from dedicated speciali
arXiv:2610.12233v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recursive self-improvement, the participation of AI systems in improving their own capabilities, is beginning to move from theoretical prospect to pra
arXiv:2610.12361v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models increasingly justify legal decisions by naming the statute or precedent behind a verdict, treated as evidence that the decision fo
arXiv:2609.16541v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We test the performance of agents for automated network intrusion response in a cyber range intended for human operator training. The range implements
arXiv:2609.16777v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as primary knowledge retrieval interfaces, their robustness against extit{persuasion attacks}---attem
arXiv:2609.00487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier language models that refuse harmful single-turn prompts often comply when the same intent is reached gradually over many turns, making multi-
arXiv:2608.17067v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As text-to-image generative models advance, they raise critical safety concerns, particularly the generation of Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content such as
arXiv:2608.12984v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-form research reports generated by large language models drift, contradict themselves, and lose provenance: the same metric appears with differen
arXiv:2608.10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks. Adversarial inputs can exploit interact
arXiv:2607.22569v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Coding agents are increasingly integrated into system operations, where their tool use can directly modify project artifacts, execution environments, an
arXiv:2607.19371v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based Socratic tutors increasingly guide students through multi-turn questioning, but they can suffer from scaffolding collap
arXiv:2607.05462v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse. We present BioSecBench-Refu
An update. A US official tells me that Sen. Warner misunderstood the NSA director Gen. Rudd in this case. Rudd did use the 'hours, not weeks' wording, but the use of Mythos in this context was—as wide
arXiv:2606.05101v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Audio deepfake detection (ADD) models are critical for countering the malicious use of text-to-speech (TTS) models. Evaluating and strengthening ADD m
arXiv:2605.22258v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) require robust toxicity evaluation beyond explicit wording. This setting remains underexplored in Chinese, where toxicity m
arXiv:2602.16346v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM-based agents execute real-world workflows via tools and memory. These affordances enable ill-intended adversaries to also use these agents to ca
arXiv:2605.18239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attempts that circumvent safety guardrails. We investigate whether multi-turn conversation
arXiv:2509.10546v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in finance, where unsafe behavior can lead to serious regulatory risks. However, most r
arXiv:2610.12758v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models have been adopted faster than evaluation practices that reliably assess their risks, and a growing share of use is affective rather than
arXiv:2506.09956v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of LLMs: executing unauthorized tasks from untrusted sources. Despite the pra
New York Times: Sources: Anthropic's AI agents submitted 20 visa applications via a form on the US State Department website; the applications were incomplete and not processed — The Philadelphia Polic
arXiv:2610.09240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern web agents built on large vision-language models process webpages, select relevant UI elements, and translate model outputs into browser action
arXiv:2610.09906v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security Operations Centers (SOCs) for information technology and operational technology share one incident-response problem: a flood of correlated al
arXiv:2610.07323v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security evaluation of learning-based systems requires more than just testing the system against a fixed collection of attacks. It requires adaptive m
arXiv:2603.04364v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multimodal web agents that process both screenshots and accessibility trees are increasingly deployed to interact with web interfaces, yet the
arXiv:2602.03255v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Computer-use agents (CUAs) execute multi-stage tasks through tools, where an early unsafe decision can propagate to consequential actions. Evaluatin
arXiv:2610.01058v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Quantized large language models are increasingly deployed on edge devices for their low latency and energy efficiency. However, model quantization wea
arXiv:2610.00559v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have shown strong multimodal reasoning capabilities, yet whether they truly capture the physical consistency underlying re
arXiv:2610.00960v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A video benchmark should reward the capability it claims to measure, yet models can exploit answer options, question text, or partial visual evidence. W
arXiv:2609.38971v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Embodied vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as high-level planners for robots because they generalize across diverse environments
arXiv:2609.38389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that circumvent safety alignment to elicit harmful outputs. It remains unclear h
arXiv:2609.40027v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Causal action verifiers gate an agent's state-changing tool calls by checking whether each proposed intervention is identifiable against a committed act
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that s
arXiv:2412.16633v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM-based robots use Large Language Models (LLMs) as planners to translate natural language instructions into policies such as grasp(), move_to(), a
arXiv:2505.14368v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent studies demonstrate that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate harmful or sensitive outputs. As open-sou
arXiv:2609.30383v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A skill is a modular package of natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and reference resources that an agent can load at runtime to extend i
Every week, I talk with founders who are building at an unbelievable pace. Teams are moving from inception to product-market fit faster than ever, with foundation models wired deeply into their core p
arXiv:2609.23894v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI extends LLM security beyond generated content to persistent state, autonomous actions, tool use, and interactions with humans and other age
arXiv:2312.06632v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Artificial intelligence is rapidly advancing scientific discovery, but this progress carries risks of misuse, such as the creation of harmful substa
arXiv:2609.19101v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As models scale, reward hacking becomes more frequent, more sophisticated, and more consequential. Does it leave a telltale signature in model represent
arXiv:2607.18063v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation. We present a 21-scenario benchmark f
New York Times: Democrats and Republicans proposed many bills to address major AI threats over the past two years, but they remain stymied by partisan disputes and lobbying — For years, Democrats and
arXiv:2609.15422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents are provisioned the same as employee-owned hosts in many enterprise settings with a static credential set fixed at deployment which includes a
arXiv:2609.15134v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Computer-use agents increasingly interact with browsers, terminals, file systems, and external services, introducing safety risks that emerge through ru
arXiv:2609.14861v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A deployed language model may refuse a harmful request in English yet comply with its faithful translation, revealing a cross-lingual safety failure t
arXiv:2606.23189v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Computer-use agents (CUAs) now act on a user's behalf across personal applications such as email, calendars, and to-do lists. This cross-appli
arXiv:2606.16000v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce GRACE-DS, a Guarded Reward-guided Agent Correction Environment in Data Science for pre-deployment evaluation of LLM-powered AutoML agen
arXiv:2609.09404v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI frameworks let a language model plan, keep memory, and call tools that reach real files, mail, and services. Most of these agents also read
arXiv:2606.16723v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly take actions (screening applicants, recommending credit, triaging patients), yet fairness for LLMs is