Safety
Across Viewpoints and Time: Trajectory-Generalizable Physical Attacks on World Models and Video Understanding Models
arXiv:2610.15343v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models and video understanding models are increasingly deployed in dynamic visual environments, yet their robustness to physical adversarial threa
arXiv:2610.15343v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models and video understanding models are increasingly deployed in dynamic visual environments, yet their robustness to physical adversarial threats remains largely underexplored. We study whether a single physical adversarial texture can mislead the victim model across different real-world scenarios where observing viewpoints vary along uncontrolled object--camera trajectories. We identify that heterogeneous video semantics and trajectories induce poorly aligned gradients for optimizing the adversarial texture. To address that, we propose the Trajectory-aware adversarial Alignment and Refinement Attack (TARA), which incorporates trajectory-aware optimization to capture the evolving geometric variations of a printed texture under real-world scenarios. To improve cross-instance optimization compatibility, TARA incorporates trajectory-aware contrastive alignment to encourage attacked representations from diverse video--trajectory instances to approach a shared adversarial region and then performs trajectory-aware task refinement to translate the aligned representation into task-level prediction errors. For reproducible evaluation, we develop a geometry-grounded tracking pipeline that provides physically plausible adversarial regions with temporally consistent trajectories on EPIC-KITCHENS-100 and Something-Something V2. We further collect real-world print-and-recapture videos to validate attack effectiveness under physical deployment conditions. Together, the annotated benchmarks and real-world captured data form a reproducible testbed for future evaluation. Notably, our results reveal that a single printable adversarial texture can persistently disrupt world models and video understanding models under physical conditions, highlighting the fundamental security challenge.
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Source: arXiv cs.CV | 2026-10-14