Safety

Asymptotic Universal Alignment: A New Alignment Framework via Test-Time Scaling

arXiv:2601.08777v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Aligning large language models (LLMs) to serve users with heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences is a central challenge for per

DGX agentpaper
safetyarxiv-cs-ai

arXiv:2601.08777v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Aligning large language models (LLMs) to serve users with heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences is a central challenge for personalized and trustworthy AI. We formalize an ideal notion of universal alignment through test-time scaling: for each prompt, the model produces kge 1 candidate responses and a user selects their preferred one. We introduce (k,f(k))-robust alignment, which requires the k-output model to have win rate f(k) against any other single-output model, and asymptotic universal alignment (U-alignment), which requires f(k)o 1 as koinfty. Our main result characterizes the optimal convergence rate: there exists a family of single-output policies whose k-sample product policies achieve U-alignment at rate f(k)=frac{k}{k+1}, and no method can achieve a faster rate in general. We show that popular post-training methods, including Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF), can fundamentally underutilize the benefits of test-time scaling. Even though NLHF is optimal for k=1, sampling from the resulting (often deterministic) policy cannot guarantee win rates above frac{1}{2} except for an arbitrarily small slack. This stems from a lack of output diversity: existing alignment methods can collapse to a single majority-preferred response, making additional samples redundant. In contrast, our approach preserves output diversity and achieves the optimal test-time scaling rate. In particular, we propose a family of symmetric multi-player alignment games and prove that any symmetric Nash equilibrium policy of the (k+1)-player alignment game achieves the optimal (k,frac{k}{k+1})-robust alignment. Finally, we provide theoretical convergence guarantees for self-play learning dynamics in these games and extend the framework to opponents that also generate multiple responses.

Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-09-30

Loading related sources…