Extracting Forgotten Prompts from Targeted Unlearned Models

arXiv:2609.03662v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent unlearning methods (e.g. NPO, DPO, LUNAR) make use of refusal alignment to suppress forgotten data. However, it has been shown that refusal responses might leave traces of unlearning, and recent attacks have been able to successfully recover some of the unlearned knowledge. In this paper, we uncover a new vulnerability. Existing attacks typically assume that the forgotten prompts are already known to the adversary and focus on recovering their answers. However, we show that the forgotten prompts themselves can be extracted by using the retained data and black-box access to the model. Our attack, Targeted Active Search (TAS), first identifies the forgotten entities by constructing canonical templates and entity pool, and selectively querying the model using the most informative template-entity pair under a limited query budget. Once the entities are identified, TAS instantiates prompt templates with those entities to probe the unlearned model and reconstruct the forgotten prompts. Experiments across three unlearning methods with three datasets and three LLMs shows that TAS recovers the forgotten entity with 100% accuracy and reconstructs up to 95% of forgotten prompts, all while using up to 99.7% fewer queries than naive probing.

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Source: arXiv cs.LG | 2026-09-04