No One Wins in Nuclear War: A Social Simulation of Military Decision-making

arXiv:2608.01868v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: WOPR is a social-simulation environment for studying how organizations make high-stakes decisions, built on a deterministic, replay-validated rules engine and using wargames as the vehicle. We instantiate it first with the published card game Nuclear War, traced against its published rules. We start with military decision-making because of its safety implications and because it needs further study, but the design is not specific to it: the decision-point contract that exposes the engine to agents is reusable across verifiable rule systems. Existing social-simulation work emphasizes persona fidelity and synthetic opinion, but lacks a verifiable rules engine with replay-checkable mechanics and private-channel negotiation. WOPR supplies that engine, and its contract makes every strategic choice an explicit agent decision. The method is agnostic to social-simulation frameworks; we adopt Concordia as the default harness for driving the game. On the same engine, WOPR layers a four-rung press ladder from silence to private single-recipient channels with structured commitments, and instantiates each faction as a collective command-and-control system rather than a single agent. We make all code, example configurations, and replay data publicly available at https://github.com/eilab-gt/wopr.

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Source: arXiv cs.CL | 2026-08-04