Research
No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
arXiv:2408.10077v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-scree
arXiv:2408.10077v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.
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Source: arXiv cs.LG | 2026-09-11