Peer Oversight in Collective Decision Making

arXiv:2608.28754v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This article introduces peer k-oversight, a property of sequential collective decision mechanisms requiring at least k agents to be responsible for every harmful outcome. It is shown that whenever k-oversight can be achieved by redistributing control over the decisions in a mechanism, it can be achieved using just k agents. A polynomial-time algorithm is also presented that determines whether such a redistribution exists and, when it does, constructs one. These results establish peer oversight as a tractable design principle for multiagent decision-making systems.

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Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-09-01