Proportional Committee Elections with Positive and Negative Votes

arXiv:2503.01985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select k winners based on these preferences. A central focus of recent research in the area has been to achieve proportional representation. In this work, we explore notions of proportionality in a more expressive setting that allows voters to vote against candidates---a common feature on online polling platforms and beyond. We propose two conceptually distinct interpretations of negative votes, resulting in different perspectives of proportionality. In the first, preventing the election of disapproved candidates is as important to voters as electing approved ones. In the second, approvals and disapprovals are treated separately, with each receiving its own fairness guarantees. For each approach, we introduce suitable axioms capturing proportionality and examine their satisfiability by appropriate variants of Phragmen's rule, Proportional Approval Voting rule (PAV), and the Method of Equal Shares (MES).

Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-08-13