Query-Only Backdoor Attacks on Self-Evolving Skills via Trajectory Poisoning

arXiv:2608.08303v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic skills improve large language model (LLM) agents by encoding reusable procedures for complex tasks. However, manually authored skills often adapt poorly to long-horizon tasks and changing environments. To address the limitation, self-evolving skill systems have been developed to automatically construct and update skills from execution trajectories, shifting skill acquisition from external marketplaces to a trusted evolution pipeline. By replacing external skill acquisition with trusted internal construction, self-evolving skill systems reduce exposure to skill injection attacks that rely on direct skill manipulation. However, this skill evolution pipeline may introduce a new attack surface in which an attacker can indirectly steer skill evolution by inducing compromised trajectories through agent interactions. To demonstrate the threat, we propose Trajectory Backdoor Attack (TBA), a query-only attack that steers a trusted skill-evolution pipeline toward producing a backdoored skill. Specifically, we craft attacker-submitted queries to lead the agent to perform the target action and explicitly state the corresponding activation condition in the trajectory. We repeat the same condition-action pattern across diverse triggered tasks, while leaving clean queries unchanged, encouraging the evolver to consolidate the pattern as a reusable trigger-dependent rule into the evolved skill. Experiments on three benchmarks across two skill-evolution systems using four open- and closed-source backbone models demonstrate that TBA reliably implants conditional backdoors while preserving clean-task utility, matching or even surpassing direct skill injection. The results reveal a critical vulnerability in trajectory-driven skill evolution.

Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-08-11