STAIN-FL: Stealthy Targeted Attack Injection with Contextual Triggers in Federated Learning

arXiv:2608.23952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated video anomaly detection trains model collaboratively without sharing raw surveillance footage, but limited server-side visibility lets compromised clients to inject backdoor via malicious updates. This paper introduces STAIN-FL, a stealthy targeted backdoor attack injection framework that uses naturally occurring surveillance conditions, including low-light scenes, indoor settings, and crowd density, as contextual triggers. STAIN-FL combines anomaly-to-benign label extit{manipulation} with gradient masking over least-updated coordinates to preserve clean accuracy while inducing trigger-conditioned misclassification. We evaluate STAIN-FL on exttt{UCF-Crime} using 1024-dimensional I3D features in a non-IID four-client multi-agency setting, comparing FedAvg and FedProx under sparse and continuous attacks. Results show that sparse attacks have low-detectability, operationally significant attacks rather than high-intensity attacks: they keep the mean clean-accuracy drop below 2%, yet still misclassify more than half of triggered anomalies at peak backdoor accuracy under FedAvg (56.7%) and FedProx (54.2%). Under FedAvg, the sparse backdoor remains above the 25% backdoor-accuracy threshold for an average of 336 post-attack rounds, highlighting the persistence risk of contextually triggered attacks in surveillance systems.

Related

• FLAT: Revealing Hidden Latent-Conditioned Backdoor Failures in Federated Learning
• Robust Federated Learning under Adversarial Attacks via Loss-Based Client Clustering
• CLIP-Inspector: Model-Level Backdoor Detection for Prompt-Tuned CLIP via OOD Trigger Inversion

Source: arXiv cs.AI | 2026-08-26